

and every passenger, those three constituting the ticket for the whole passage—one for the Atlantic to Aspinwall, one for the Red Sea across the Isthmus, and one for the Pacific steamer. Great care should be taken that the ticket for the Isthmus is not lost, as this will subject the holder to an annual expense of \$25 whether a full passenger on the boat or not. No excuse or apology will avail as a palliating circumstance; not even positive proof that you purchased one or had it when you entered the cars, will secure the passage across—pay behind or pay in the world. For safe keeping, therefore, it will be well to put the Isthmus tickets in an envelope by themselves and those for the passage from New York to Aspinwall and the Pacific, also by themselves in other envelopes. You will not need the Isthmus tickets till they are called for in the cars, nor those for the Pacific till you get on board that steamer, hence there is no necessity of having them together. Mark each envelope as follows:—“Atlantic Tickets,” “Isthmus Tickets,” “Pacific Tickets.” Thus marked you will know when you look at your envelopes which you want. If you pass the Isthmus in the forenoon, take the water side to the west, and the land side to the east, and avoid in a great measure the influence of the hot sun.

These directions and precautions may appear to some silly and unnecessary, but when one comes to take into consideration the multiplicity of additional cares that will be thrown upon him in going such a journey, through such a world of changes, and with such an army of strangers interspersed with black-legs and thieves, whose business it is to deceive, steal and rob, and witness the losses and complaints of various kinds on the passage, I think he will agree with me that they are not wholly superfluous; he will find on the other hand that experience will convince him of their utility and necessity.

If I were to fill a column with such information as I have here—the best I could gather from my own experience and observation it would but poorly convey an adequate idea of the many and varied duties and wants that will cluster around one.

Many will be giving you advice in regard to this and that matter, and course to be pursued; but just follow these directions so far as you can make a general application of them to your wants, and you will do better than to be all the time trying to follow this and that one's advice.

You will find many foolish enough to tell you that you may stand out on the deck of the ship in the cold damp atmosphere in the evening without any fear of catching cold, giving as a reason that no one can take cold on the sea.—If any one is verdant enough to heed such advice, all I have to say is, he will pay dearly for it by taking one of the worst colds he ever had in his life. Thus I have hastily and in a disconnected and desultory manner given you some general directions as I think may be of advantage to any one who has become so foolish or careless as to make his mind to leave his home and friends and business to come to this country, thinking to better his condition, in a moral, physical, spiritual or pecuniary sense.

Let me say to all whose eyes these lines may chance to meet, that the Isthmus is not so simple a state as Maine. This may be denied but I hold myself responsible to make the statement good by positive living testimony and actual statistics.

This says one, contradicts the experience of many who have been there. I cannot help it. But what is that experience? Let us see. I, well, my father had a brother who had a wife and she had a son, and he had the phthisis and went to California and was cured. Very remarkable case this. And more than this, there never was a case of consumption or asthma known to originate there. Ha, Ha, what a healthy state California is! But suppose we look at statistics for a moment,—there can be no harm in this, as it will only show how extensive and accurate your observation has been. Here is one medical institution in San Francisco, that reports having received 220 cases of asthma during the year 1860, and 80 of pulmonary consumption. People that are born here and have always lived here, have a year of consumption, and it is as sure death to a man whose lungs are affected to come here as it would be to put a ball through his heart, as a general rule.

Four hundred and forty seven cases of Rheumatism are reported as having been admitted and treated at the same medical institution, as spoken of above. The newspapers are filled with advertisements to cure Asthma in a few days, and if there are no cases here, why is this? Who will answer? More of California soon.

C. H. C.

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A contemporary whose opinions we value as highly as those of any journal which comes to our table (the Boston Advertiser), in speaking of the more “radical” views entertained by the Secretary of War upon the topic we have been discussing, says that the “conservative position on this subject” held by the President and the majority of his cabinet, as exemplified in the modification of Gen. Fremont's proclamation and all the subsequent acts of the administration, shows that “the spirit in which the war is conducted is that of non-interference, so far as possible, in the affairs of any State.” And who, pray, is the State? If it be the rebels, why prohibit their ports, to invest their soil with hostile armies, and to deny their right to “form their institutions in their own way”? i. e., to secede and become a part of the Jeff. Davis Confederacy? And if the loyal citizens be the State, then is it “interference” against their interests to take any effective means to weaken their rebel enemies, in the midst of whom they can declare their loyalty only at the price of their lives? “Non-interference, so far as possible, with the affairs of any State”? The men who control “affairs” in South Carolina are rebels, who have sworn to resist the government, and who maintain the position of the parties and the constitutional obligations of loyal citizens to rebels and insurrectionists forms any legal or moral barrier to the exercise of this right. We maintain the incontrovertible, legal and constitutional right of the government to adopt such a course, without the violation of any obligation for the protection of the institutions of any State. If there are valid objections to such a policy, they must arise from doubt of its material efficiency, or an overbalancing prejudice to the interests of loyal southern citizens by its exercise, and not from a squeamish and ridiculous delicacy about interfering with slavery in the hands of our enemies.

Let it be understood that there is a broad and great distinction between a “crusade against slavery,” as an institution, and the confiscation of slave property in the hands of rebels, and the employment of negroes against the rebels, as a measure of military policy or necessity.—To proclaim a general emancipation of slaves in the seceded States, and the entire abolition of the institution of slavery therein, would be an unwarranted and unconstitutional act, because the rebels are, in no case, the State, and such a course would be a direct interference with the rights of loyal citizens, which they have legally possessed under the Constitution. But to confiscate the slave property of insurrectionists in armed rebellion against the government,—to annul their claim to the “labor and service” of such “property,” and even to employ the “property” in any effective way against the rebels, as a means of weakening

and destroying the power and force of the enemy, is quite a different thing, and proceeds upon an entirely different principle. To consider the subject of slavery, in its philanthropic, social, political or economical bearings, is nothing in this contest, but to utterly crush this wicked rebellion and restore the power of the government and the unity of the nation, by every legitimate and effective means, is everything. The only manner in which the government and its defenders should take cognizance of slavery, in carrying on this war for the salvation of the nation, is in the light of this question:—Is slavery, in the hands of rebels, an element of strength to the rebellion, and if so, can this element of strength be destroyed, and the rebel cause be thereby distracted and weakened?

At the South, the rebels have declared their institution of slavery to be a source of great military strength, because it enabled them to keep nearly four millions of people steadily at work, supporting nearly their entire fighting population in the field. Is this Southern view of the matter correct? So long as the government confines the war to the frontier slave States, leaving the great mass of plantation slaves to continue their work undisturbed, and so long as the administration is careful to do nothing to interfere with the efficiency of this slave labor for the rebels, the rebel boast of the military strength of slavery is undoubtedly to a great extent justified. The act passed at the special session of Congress “to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes” declares that all property used “in aiding, abetting or promoting such insurrection or rebellion, shall be lawful subject of prize and capture, wherever found, and shall be seized and confiscated. Now what property so essentially aids and abets the insurrection, and those engaged in it, as that upon which the rebels are almost entirely dependent for their support—viz., slave property? Why does the government so unhesitatingly deprive the rebels of the national right to ship their great staple production to its market, and be so extremely fastidious about interfering with the exercise of their unnatural right to hold slaves, who produce all their cotton? Why is this peculiar species of property held by our enemy—a species of property which is not recognized by other Christian nations, and the holding of which is esteemed by them an inhuman system—why is this species of property of the rebels invested with special sanctity by our government, while their other property used in abetting rebellion (and which is recognized as property by the common law everywhere) is summarily confiscated?

We would not have the government inaugurate a “crusade against slavery,” as an object of the employment of its arms, but we do not see that the placing the slave property of rebels on an equality of treatment with their other property would justify such an imputation, any more than the blockade of the southern ports gives authority for characterizing the war on the part of the government as a crusade against the cotton trade.

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